specifically as it applies to the National Guard. The research reveals a definite disconnect between the U.S. Army's intended mobilization process and end state, and the activities within the states using New York as an example.
DEPLOYMENT OF THE NATIONAL GUARD: MOBILIZATION IN CONFUSION
Mobilization of a strategic reserve is one thing….mobilization of an operational reserve is quite another.
-Major General Joseph J. Taluto   1 The epigraph above captures the concern of a senior National Guard leader over the mobilization process as it exists today. While problems with the mobilization process affect every component it can be argued that any mobilization problem manifests itself most heavily within the Army National Guard.
This purpose of his paper is to offer recommendations to problems existing in the mobilization of the National Guard. In order to lay out the argument that problems do indeed exist and why, this paper will examine why it is now critical to permanently solve the problem of National Guard mobilizations, demonstrate how mobilization efforts have fared historically and finally explore the current mobilization process which initially manifested itself in confusion then responded to emergency repair efforts and reached the current period of efficiency.
The Transformation of the National Guard as an Operational Reserve
The imperative to solve National Guard mobilization problems is a critical step within the requirement of the Department of Defense that the National Guard become an operational reserve. Time will no longer be a resource which the active or Guard components can expend in mobilization yet it is time which the National Guard has historically required. As will be described later in this paper the process of mobilization of the National Guard has never been smoothly performed. The shift to a Strategic
Reserve force capable of acting as an Operational Reserve is expensive, complex, and will not be easily or quickly completed. Nevertheless, America's reluctance to reinstitute a draft makes it plainly obvious that the National Guard will augment the active military and it is essential to make this augmentation successful beyond the current period of conflict. Efficiency during mobilization is the first key to achieving rapid augmentation possible. Neither speed in moving through the mobilization process nor efficiency in manning, equipping or training the National Guard has been the historic hallmark of large scale National Guard mobilizations. Can this transformation survive the post war period of retrenchment which is likely to occur when faced with the anticipated reductions in both the Army's base budget and supplemental budgetary authorizations?
Will the struggle to protect critical Army initiatives now underway cause a reprioritization of the need to re-structure the Guard's transformation? Historic questions and ones which will profoundly alter the National Guard but the nexus between the National Guard and the active Army is the process of mobilization. This nexus, or perhaps better phrased, this gateway, has historically not functioned efficiently.
The Army National Guard is now unquestionably in a profound period of transformation. Not since the mobilization during World War II has the National Guard been afforded (or perhaps forced) to come to grips with the mobilization of the majority of its assigned personnel onto active duty (Title 10, USC). Simultaneously, the National Guard is increasingly required to respond to the growing threat of terrorism within the confines of the 54 states and territories. Both tasks demand serious, if not sweeping modifications to the National Guard's day to day operations and its capability to seamlessly, efficiently, and quickly produce quality results.
The National Guard cannot accomplish these tasks on its own however much it desires to do so. The Guard is only a part of the U.S. Army and the way ahead requires a shared vision, a shared plan, and most importantly, a shared view on the National
Guard's worth towards the common overseas "war fight" and the defense of the home land. The legacy of 63 years of relatively low use of the National Guard as an integral asset within the larger U.S. Army during periods of conflict has created a system of high intensity repair for the selected pieces of the Guard mobilized for various conflicts. The manning, training, equipping aspects of the National Guard have, by necessity, evolved differently than the active duty army. Under pinning every activity in the National Guard has been deep constraints in funding vis-à-vis like type units in the active army.
One of the most dramatic shifts has been in the role and the capabilities of the National Guard," he said. "For much of the last century … the Guard was … considered a strategic reserve standing by in case of a mass mobilization. It was not a priority for funding and equipment, even though its members had served in every conflict since the Revolutionary War.
2
The strategic decision to maintain the National Guard as a Strategic Reserve set the conditions for the posture of readiness shortfalls and unfortunately, a condition of mistrust between the active Army and the National Guard which must now be overcome. The battlefield of the future will be an affair of sophistication, complexity, and intensity little understood and never before experienced. We can anticipate little or no prior warning before the conflict begins which dictates that RC units will be deployed essentially in a come-as-you-are posture with relatively little, if any, post mobilization time to train. On the basis of our work, we concluded that the pre-mobilization training plans developed by the three round-out brigades were based on unreliable readiness ratings. Specifically, Second Army and III Corps officials were skeptical of the accuracy of the brigades' reported readiness ratings, even after these ratings were revised following mobilization. Key officials involved in the training of the three brigades believed that the readiness reports fell far short of capturing the true status of the brigades' combat proficiency. 10 The active Army pointed to its metrics accumulated over years of work with the brigades and declared that the facts spoke for themselves. Controversy existed between the active Army and the National Guard over the accuracy and fairness of the process of mobilization but the fact remained clearly evident for everyone in the Guard; its formations did not deploy and readiness shortfalls were the cause. The relationship between the active Army and the state-run Guard is characterized by an "us or them" environment that, if not improved, could undermine prospects for significant improvement in the brigades' ability to conduct successful combat operations.
Training Support Brigades and their
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The TSB's dedicated to provide Training Readiness Oversight (TRO) to the Guard were a little appreciated asset by those Guard units receiving their assistance. A spirit of suspicion stemming from a realization that each entity had a different agenda prevailed. The Guard was painfully ware of its shortcomings and the TSB was determined to expose them without offering resources (except trainers) to fix them.
However, the National Guard directly and even profoundly benefited by the presence of the TSB's. The crux of the problem of seamless training oversight was command authority. The National Guard did not (and still do not) wish active Army officers to rate their officers and without rating authority the active Army TSB leaders could do no more There was little time for a "Traditional Guard" commander and staff to accomplish even those activities to standard although all worked tirelessly to perform those missions.
Historically, the policy of "tiered readiness" means that, in a resourceconstrained environment, where there is insufficient funding to resource all units simultaneously with the latest equipment and training, those units expected to deploy first receive the newest equipment and funding. This resource allocation strategy ensures that the first units to deploy can do so immediately, without delays for receipt of newer equipment, additional people, and/or training. Consequently, the reserve components, which were expected to have more time to get ready, have received less funding, less training, and less modern equipment than their active component counterparts. RC forces make up over 54 percent of the total force; yet receive less than 11 percent of the Army's budget.
14 Although funding for the National Guard can be legitimately and honestly argued from multiple perspectives, the simple fact, daily made obvious to nearly all Guardsmen was that they lacked enough funding to do anything but the basics in training and equipping themselves. As small as even the issue of appearance might seem, simply finding funds to buy paint for rolling stock, perform critical maintenance on every type of equipment or conduct truly essential training was hard to the point at which it sapped morale of soldiers at all grades. The Mob process has been studied and studied during peacetime. I can say that with credibility as a 43 year full time National Guardsman. In 2002 a serious mob study was undertaken at FORSCOM. Simply assembling the division was an area of complexity that no agency within the mobilization process had addressed prior to the 42 nd ID's alert. This is clearly evident from a review of the manning, equipping, and training functions.
Manning the Force; Early OIF/OEF (2003-2005). Many National Guard units
were now faced with the challenge of filling themselves to their authorized strength.
Within the 42 nd Infantry Division, the division G1 struggled to adjust its existing Army of Excellence (AOE) MTOE to mirror active Army MTOE's. Sections such as the G8, G6, G2X/G2 Fusion Cell, G1/G4 LNO augmentation, G5 Plans, G6 Plans, a Liaison Section, Safety Section, and a PAO Section did not exist in the MTOE of the 42nd and had to be created, manned, and trained during the pre-deployment phase of the operation. Much of this equipment, deemed not necessary by both the 42 nd ID and the 1 st United States Army, was redeployed, at considerable effort in time away from training, back to the states from which this equipment had been provided. 20 The "come-as-you-are-war" and tiered readiness issues of these vehicles generated a negative perception by the American public of the National Guard well beyond the battlefield reality. 21 Many National Guard after action reviews (AAR's), refer to equipping issues in tremendous detail. The fact that some active units also deploy with older equipment and serious shortfalls is not well known to most Guard soldiers who see themselves as perennially at the end of the equipment pipeline. Regardless, most of those under resourced active units were not combat units whereas the Guard formations were. The corrective curve at the mobilization stations was immense.
Training the Force; Early OIF/OEF (2003-2005). Training the National Guard
formations at the mobilization stations during the early years of OIF/OEF was the area of greatest concern to Guard soldiers and their families. The 42 nd Infantry Division's AAR is again informative:
Issue: Relevancy of Tasks for Training Certification Discussion: Many of the individual tasks trained at the mobilization stations were not relevant to the current environment in Iraq. For example, some of the mandatory tasks were self-extraction from a minefield, land navigation and react to NBC attack. These were not relevant tasks in OIF III. More instruction was required for example in Rules of Engagement (ROE), specifically those related to convoy movement. Many Soldiers in OIF III lacked discipline when engaging targets on convoy movements. TF Liberty had to publish FRAGO 211 detailing ROE regarding warning shots and use of graduated force. This type of training was far more relevant than many of the tasks that were required for certification.
22
Training plans, when transposed into a calendar format were referred to as a "Horse Blanket". Units arriving at the mobilization station were surprised to learn that 1 st United States Army expected them to develop their own training plans and horse blankets. These units were provided small TSB teams who would advise them on how to best translate the lists of required training into manageable training days but with few exceptions were left to figure the process out as best they could. For the vast majority of the training the unit provided their own "trained-trainers".
All individual training was conducted in this fashion. The same units and soldiers who were evaluated by the TSB's prior to OIF/OEF as deficient during training evaluations were now fully expected to (in large measure) train themselves. The TSB stepped in to train a small number of critical blocks of collective training but often few of these soldiers had yet seen combat and were only able to teach what they believed was tactically sound. Soldiers knew of the emerging threat in Iraq and paid strict attention to these trainers. Later, many soldiers came to question why they were not exposed to training which reflected the current situation in theater and complained that some of the training they had received was wrong. Exacerbating this problem was the fact that subordinate brigades below the 42ID trained at different mobilization stations with different training standards. Extracted from the 42ID's AAR, the division G3 highlighted the problem succinctly:
An evolving battlefield environment generating new doctrine and TTP's requires continuous situational awareness to ensure relevant training is conducted. The TSB Commander rewrote his training plan based on observations from the first PDSS (pre-deployment site survey). As the training program matured, the Fort Drum MOC (mobilization operations center) and TSB relinquished most of their responsibilities to the Division staff particularly in the management of TDY, schools, and eventually postmobilization training. The feedback the 42ID received from the 116 BCT and 278RCT Commanders was that the same process did not occur within their commands. Upon return from the PDSS, the 116 BCT and the 278 RCT Commanders were not afforded an opportunity to adjust their training program based on their in-theater observations. Consequently, their training programs failed to reflect the evolving operational environment. As in past major mobilizations, the entire system is now settling down into a sustainable period of efficiency. A number of major adjustments have occurred that have reduced the swirl of unknown challenges and have brought order, predictability and relative calm to the mobilization process. There are countless day to day problems that every deploying unit and 1 st United States Army seek to solve and it is unrealistic to expect that this situation will ever be alleviated even under the most efficient of mobilization systems but as a whole it is effective. However, there remain a small number of significant challenges to mobilization which have yet to be completely solved;
MTOE mismatches, manning stability, equipment shortfalls, and pre-mobilization training within the states. This last item is critical because the 1 st United States Army now considers the notification of sourcing (NOS) (up to 2 years prior to mobilization day)
to be the start point of mobilization. A brief examination of these systemic problems is warranted, first, it may be beneficial to examine what is now working well.
What is Working? The process of mobilization has now proceeded sufficiently within this current set of conflicts to have settled into a period of mobilization efficiency.
Historically, this was to be expected. Despite a cumbersome and difficult to use The Army budget has provided sufficient funds to the mobilization process to permit every actor within the mobilization process the resources necessary to overcome the most egregious manning, training, and equipping problems.
The ARFORGEN process has begun to work. Predictability in the rotation schedule has permitted the Guard enough alert time to set units up for success.
ARFORGEN has permitted the invention of the Notification of Sourcing year which has allowed the Guard to advance countless man/train/equip functions heretofore unachievable until mobilization. The complete list of advantages is long.
The States have constructed their own efficient mobilization processes and have become active partners with 1 st Army in a "design through launch" mobilization process.
The Adjutants General of the States retain certification authority of all training required to be performed prior to arrival at the mobilization station. This partnership, and the collegiate manner in which it has evolved, has done much to eliminate friction between deploying units, the TSB's, and the States. It must be sustained. essential to subsequent operations. 24 Soldiers continue to leave formations after alert despite "stop-loss" as they gain release due to SRC, family, and work conflict problems.
Additionally, the new replacements force the unit to redo blocks of training again and again which slows the tempo of training completion; both great concerns to the states and 1 st Army. Of perhaps greatest concern to both the Army and the Guard is the impact on "feeder" units supplying either Soldiers as individual replacements or whole unit entities taken from one command to plug into the deploying formation in order to bring it to no less than 100 percent of its authorized strength. "Breaking" units has been
and will continue to be a plague on Guard mobilizations. 25 Equipment shortfalls are both a blessing and a curse; a blessing in that many
Guard units were so poorly equipped prior to mobilization that almost all of their current deployment property had to be fielded during deployment and is now "state of the art" rather than "good enough" to accomplish the mission. The curse has been the demands on Soldiers, staffs, and commanders forced to deal with this problem at the expense of training. Under tiered readiness many Guard Units received "hand-medown" older equipment after the active forces received newer items. Secretary Gates has directed that the problem be resolved. 26 There are many hidden expenses in this new process but all can be overcome with a quick and effusive outlay of funds. Any failure to commit funds in the future as have been dedicated in the recent past will severely and negatively impact on any large scale pre-mobilization effort.
Conclusion
The lessons in mobilization from WWII to the present period speak to the nature of National Guard mobilizations as a process of learning and forgetting. In fairness, if "forgetting" is the wrong word then failing to update mobilization plans and policies is irrefutable. America's unspoken decision to refrain from employing a conscript army places a new demand on the readiness of the National Guard and Reserves. More immediately, the transition from a Strategic Reserve to an Operational Force (an Operational Reserve when the nation is not in conflict) poses resource challenges which will only grow larger as this process continues. We are now moving quickly towards the oft stated condition of the "come as you are" war fight for the National Guard. Unlike in decades past, when that phrase meant the Guard might be expected to deploy in a condition of questionable readiness it now implies that these formations must deploy in exemplary condition. Today's mobilization process must be efficient, short, and deliver dependable forces with nearly seamless interoperability to a combatant commander who has no time and resources to fix Guard units in theater. We no longer have the time to sort out mobilization processes.
Historically, the Guard experienced mobilization confusion, inefficiency, and staggering ineptitude in the early months (and even years) of each war of the 20 th century and the first one of this century only to resolve itself through painful evolution and extraordinary local and national efforts. Mobilization doctrine and policy, while voluminous, was demonstrated to be out of date, difficult to adjust, and not adequate for contemporary conflict.
The long standing condition of tiered readiness, with its implications for wide ranging equipment and training standards has shown itself to be nearly unsupportable in the eyes of American parents (of either active or Guard soldiers) who find it unacceptable to send their sons and daughters to combat with anything less than the best equipment and training.
The contorted evolutions of the mobilization process currently underway have indeed evolved to a point where endless formations of National Guardsmen are now efficiently moving through the mobilization pipe line and into theater. However, it took nearly 4 years to resolve the most disrupting factors and achieve this level of efficiency.
Few would argue that the National Guard mobilization efforts supporting OIF and OEF went as designed. The plan designed in the FORSCOM Reg. 500 series was heavily modified. The vision of 1 st U.S. Army, the National Guard Bureau and the offices of the Adjutant's Generals of the 54 states and territories was altered by new challenges with each new unit entering the mobilization process.
The emphasis of the Army's mobilization planners must now shift to redesigning the mobilization plan. Unit After Action Reviews, comments by Guard and 1 st US Army commanders, lessons learned by mobilization stations and state planners must all now be collected, synthesized, and re-formulated to become the new mobilization policy.
There are countless lessons learned by senior and mid-grade officers in both the active Army and the National Guard which are accessible only as long as those officers remain in their current positions. As they move away from those positions the institutional memory they built to overcome the endless set of problems encountered in [2003] [2004] [2005] and truthfully even today will be lost. The Army must act quickly to capture these lessons, rebuild policy, reallocate resources, and set the conditions for tomorrow's mobilization. That mobilization, when it comes, will determine if both the active Army and the National Guard of today worked hard enough for tomorrow's young warriors. 
